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THERE IS NOTHING THAT 
INTERPRETATION JUST IS 
Cass R. Sunstein* 
I. THE THESIS 
Many people believe that the Constitution must be 
interpreted in their preferred way. They insist that the very idea 
of interpretation requires judges to adopt their own method of 
construing the founding document.1 
The problem with this view is that in the legal context, there 
is nothing that interpretation “just is.”2 Among the reasonable 
alternatives, no approach to constitutional interpretation is 
mandatory. Any approach must be defended on normative 
grounds—not asserted as part of what interpretation requires by 
its nature. Whatever their preferred approach, both judges and 
lawyers must rely on normative judgments of their own.3 
Nonetheless, they sometimes claim that their own approach is 
necessary, in the sense that they have no choice but to adopt it, if 
they are to engage in interpretation at all. That claim is a recipe 
for confusion. 
It is true that some imaginable practices cannot count as 
interpretation at all. If judges do not show fidelity to authoritative 
texts, they cannot claim to be interpreting them. But without 
transgressing the legitimate boundaries of interpretation, judges 
 
 * Robert Walmsley University Professor, Harvard University. I am grateful to 
Larry Alexander, Eric Posner, Frederick Schauer, Lawrence Solum, David Strauss, and 
Mark Tushnet for invaluable comments on a previous draft. Special thanks to Solum for 
particularly detailed and illuminating suggestions, from which I have learned a great deal. 
This essay expands on the discussion in chapter 1 of CASS R. SUNSTEIN, A CONSTITUTION 
OF MANY MINDS (2011), but there are significant changes in the central argument. 
 1. See, e.g., Larry Alexander, Simple-Minded Originalism (Working Paper No. 08-
067 2008), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1235722; 
Walter Benn Michaels, A Defense of Old Originalism, 31 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 21, 21 
(2009). 
 2. The interpretation-construction distinction complicates this basic claim; for 
discussion, see below. 
 3. This is so even if those implicit judgments direct them to defer to, or to accept, 
the normative judgments of other people. See James Bradley Thayer, The Origin and 
Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7 HARV. L. REV. 129 (1893). 
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can show fidelity to texts in a variety of ways. Within those 
boundaries, the choice among possible approaches depends on 
the claim that it makes our constitutional system better rather 
than worse. Importantly, this conclusion does not, by itself, rule 
out any of the established approaches, including originalism in its 
various forms,4 democracy-reinforcement,5 “moral readings,”6 
minimalism,7 or broad deference to political processes.8 But it 
does establish the terrain on which the debates9 must be 
undertaken.10 
II. ON THE VERY IDEA OF INTERPRETATION 
A. ORIGINAL INTENTIONS 
Consider one view: In interpreting the meaning of words, we 
ask about authorial intentions. (I use the term “author” to include 
speakers as well as writers.) That is what it means to interpret 
words. 
It is true that in ordinary life, we tend to interpret words in 
this way.11 If a friend asks you to meet her at “my favorite 
restaurant,” you will probably ask what, exactly, she had in mind. 
You will not ask which restaurant you like best, or which 
restaurant is preferred by your favorite restaurant critic. It might 
even be consistent with ordinary usage to say that in ordinary 
 
 4. See Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849 (1989). 
 5. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1983). 
 6. RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE 
AMERICAN CONSTITUTION (1996). 
 7. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE 
SUPREME COURT (1999). 
 8. See J. HARVIE WILKINSON III, COSMIC CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY: WHY 
AMERICANS ARE LOSING THEIR INALIENABLE RIGHT TO SELF-GOVERNANCE (2012); 
Adrian Vermeule, JUDGING UNDER UNCERTAINTY: AN INSTITUTIONAL THEORY OF 
LEGAL INTERPRETATION (2006). See also Jeremy Waldron, The Core of the Case Against 
Judicial Review, 115 YALE L.J. 1346 (2006) (making a contingent argument against judicial 
review, in part on consequentialist grounds). 
 9. The valuable discussion in Lawrence B. Solum, The Positive Foundations of 
Formalism: False Necessity and American Legal Realism, 127 HARV. L. REV. 2464 (2014), 
can be understood to sketch a consequence-focused argument for originalism and plain 
meaning approaches to legal texts. See also JOHN O. MCGINNIS & MICHAEL B. 
RAPPAPORT, ORIGINALISM AND THE GOOD CONSTITUTION (2013). 
 10. My focus throughout is on constitutional interpretation, but it should be plain 
that the same analysis applies to statutory interpretation as well. For instructive and 
sympathetic discussions of textualism, see John F. Manning, Second-Generation 
Textualism, 98 CAL. L. REV. 1287 (2010); John F. Manning, Textualism and Legislative 
Intent, 91 VA. L. REV. 419 (2005). For a prominent rejection of textualism, see STEPHEN 
BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY: INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION (2005). 
 11. PAUL GRICE, STUDIES IN THE WAY OF WORDS (1989). 
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conversational settings, interpretation of people’s words amounts 
to an effort to elicit their intentions.12 Of course, this conclusion 
invites attention to context and purposes, not just words. If a 
friend makes some kind of linguistic error, we would not want to 
hold her to those words. But when we depart from her words, it is 
because we are trying to figure out what she had in mind. 
Some people think that legal interpretation is not 
fundamentally different. In their view, a form of originalism, 
based on the idea of authorial intention, is built into the concept 
of interpretation. For example, Larry Alexander writes that  
given what we accept as legally authoritative, the proper way 
to interpret the Constitution . . . is to seek its authors’ intended 
meanings—the same thing we do when we read a letter from 
Mom, a shopping list from our spouse, or instructions for how 
to assemble a child’s toy made in China.13  
Walter Benn Michaels goes even further:  
In fact, however, you can’t do textual interpretation without 
some appeal to authorial intention and, perhaps more 
controversially, you can’t (coherently and nonarbitrarily) think 
of yourself as still doing textual interpretation as soon as you 
appeal to something beyond authorial intention—for example, 
the original public meaning or evolving principles of justice.14 
It is true that we could define legal interpretation in this way. 
But if Alexander and Michaels are using “interpretation” in the 
standard legal sense, the definition would be a stipulation,15 and it 
would not be based on the necessary meaning of the term. Let us 
suppose that in ordinary conversation, most people understand 
the idea of interpretation to involve a search for authorial 
intentions. Even in that context, such an understanding is not 
mandatory; we could imagine the view that interpretation 
involves a search for public meaning, rather than authorial 
intentions.16 But it is certainly sensible to say that in conversation, 
 
 12. See id. 
 13. Alexander, supra note 1, at 1. 
 14. See Michaels, supra note 1, at 21. For an analogous argument, see STEVEN D. 
SMITH, LAW’S QUANDARY (2004); for an analogous argument with a focus on meaning 
rather than intentions, see Gary Lawson, On Reading Recipes . . . and Constitutions, 85 
GEO. L.J. 1823 (1997). For an instructive discussion, also with an emphasis on meaning, 
see Lawrence Solum, Semantic Originalism (2008), available at http://papers.ssrn.
com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1120244. 
 15. Alexander, supra note 1, does offer a nonstipulative argument, taken up below. 
 16. It is true, however, that such an approach would make conversation work less 
well, at least if it is too literal. Some science fiction characters apply this method to 
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we ask about intentions. If this is indeed sensible, it is for a 
pragmatic reason; the goal of the particular communication will 
not be met if we do not. When a friend asks me to meet her, or to 
do something for her, I am likely to ask about her intentions, 
because I want to meet her or to do as she would like. If my friend 
says that we should “meet at the best restaurant in town,” I will 
likely ask what she meant by those words. It is imaginable, of 
course, that she wants me to do a little work and to see what the 
restaurant critics like best—but if so, I am still trying to follow her 
subjective intentions. If interpretation entails that practice, it is 
because in the relevant context, that is the best way to understand 
the term. 
The same things might be said about communication within 
some hierarchical organization. If a supervisor tells an employee 
what to do, it is right to think that in ordinary circumstances, the 
employee ought to ask: “What, exactly, did my supervisor mean 
by that?” (The qualification “in ordinary circumstances” is 
necessary because even subordinates sometimes ask about 
something other than speaker’s intentions; everything depends on 
the role of the subordinate, some of whom might have a different 
or less deferential role.) The employee asks this question, if he 
does, for pragmatic reasons. Employees should generally follow 
the instructions of their supervisors, and the practice of following 
instructions, in hierarchical organizations, usually calls for close 
attention to the supervisors’ subjective intentions. It is plausible 
to say that in some contexts, interpretation of the instructions of 
a supervisor “just is” an effort to elicit and follow subjective 
intentions—not in the sense that this understanding of 
interpretation is inevitable or strictly mandatory, but in the sense 
that it captures how most people use the term in such contexts. If 
that is true, it is because this understanding of interpretation 
makes the supervisor-employee relationship work best. 
A possible response would be that at least in many contexts, 
it is not even possible to interpret people’s words without making 
some kind of judgment about the author’s intentions. On this 
view, the idea of meaning depends on some such judgment, and it 
is incoherent without it. In the legal context, this claim is plainly 
false, for reasons that are elaborated below.17 
 
unfortunate effect; consider Data in the television series Star Trek: The Next Generation. 
“Nerd humor” often consists of the use of public meaning, rather than intentions. 
 17. There is a question whether it is false even in ordinary communications. Suppose 
that you look up at a pattern of clouds in the sky. To your surprise, the pattern spells out 
the word “God.” Whether or not you have faith, you will have no hesitation identifying 
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B. ORIGINAL MEANING 
One conception of interpretation involves a search for 
speaker’s intentions, and in ordinary life, that is the most common 
conception. But it is easy to think of cases in which interpretation 
does not operate by reference to such intentions. In fact some of 
the most committed originalists, including Justice Scalia himself, 
believe that what matters is the original public meaning of the 
document, not intentions at all.18 In Heller, for example, Justice 
Scalia wrote that in “interpreting [the Second Amendment], we 
are guided by the principle that ‘[t]he Constitution was written to 
be understood by the voters; its words and phrases were used in 
their normal and ordinary as distinguished from technical 
meaning.’”19 In his view, “[N]ormal meaning may of course 
include an idiomatic meaning, but it excludes secret or technical 
meanings that would not have been known to ordinary citizens in 
the founding generation.”20 
Originalists themselves argue fiercely about whether the 
original meaning, or instead the original intentions, should be 
taken as authoritative21—a point that suggests that interpretation, 
to qualify as such, need not be focused on intentions. Those who 
focus on original public meaning argue that meaning is objective, 
not subjective. In their view, what matters is the standard 
understanding among the Constitution’s ratifiers, not what the 
authors “intended.” After all, the ratifiers (“We the People”), and 
not the authors, turned the Constitution into law. Rejecting 
subjective intentions, Justice Holmes wrote, “[W]e do not inquire 
what the legislature meant; we ask only what the statutes mean.”22 
 
that word. Conventions about language may be sufficient for the identification, suggesting 
the possibility that we can understand the meanings of words by reference to those 
conventions, without necessarily making judgments about author’s intentions. This 
example is contested in Steven Smith’s Law’s Quandary, supra note 14. 
 18. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008). Grice similarly 
distinguishes between “speaker’s meaning” and “sentence meaning.” See H. P. Grice, 
Utterer’s Meaning, Sentence-Meaning, and Word Meaning, 4 Found. Language 225, 225 
(1968). 
 19. Heller, 554 U.S. at 576. 
 20. Id. at 576–77. 
 21. See Michaels, supra note 1; Lawson, supra note 14; Solum, supra note 14. 
 22. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Theory of Legal Interpretation, 12 HARV. L. REV. 
417 (1899). See Solum, supra note 14, at 5: “The argument for clause meaning will be 
elaborated at length, but the intuitive idea is simple. The constitution was drafted and 
ratified by a multitude: many different individuals at different times and places. The 
intentional mental states of the multitude with respect to a given constitutional provision 
(their purposes, hopes, fears, expectations, and so forth) will themselves be multitudinous 
and inaccessible. Multitudinous, because different framers and ratifiers had different 
intentions, with the consequence that intentions alone cannot fix consistent 
(noncontradictory and not radically ambiguous) semantic content. Inaccessible, because 
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Of course those who insist on adherence to the original public 
meaning count as originalists23—but they do not rely on subjective 
intentions.24 At this point, my goal is not to take a stand on which 
form of originalism is best or most coherent, or to suggest that the 
original meaning must be taken as fixed and binding.25 (The very 
idea has more than one meaning.26) It is only to insist that a 
prominent understanding of originalism—as involving public 
meaning rather than intentions—is enough to demonstrate that 
attention to subjective intentions is not built into the very idea of 
interpretation.27 
C. CONSEQUENCES 
Is it plausible to say that interpretation necessarily entails a 
search for the original public meaning? Not at all.28 Alexander is 
right to suggest that interpretation often involves an inquiry into 
intentions rather than public meaning. (Recall that if your friend 
says, “let’s go to the best movie now playing,” you ask what she 
has in mind, not what is generally recognized as best, unless that 
 
those who were expected to engage in constitutional practice (the judges, officials, and 
citizens of the United States of American [sic] for an indefinite future) would have found 
the multitudinous intentions epistemically inaccessible.” Solum adds: “The possibility of 
constitutional communication was created by the fact that the framers and ratifiers could 
rely on the accessibility of the public meaning (or conventional semantic meaning) of the 
words, phrases, and clauses that constitute the Constitution. Not only can such public 
meanings enable constitutional communication at the time a given constitutional 
provisions is drafted, approved, and first implemented, such meanings can also become 
stable over time or be recovered if they are lost. In other words, under normal conditions 
successful constitutional communication requires reliance by the drafters, ratifiers, and 
interpreters on the original public meaning of the words and phrases.” Id. 
 23. For a valuable discussion, see Solum, supra note 14. 
 24. See Antonin Scalia, Review of Steven Smith’s Law’s Quandary, 55 CATH. U. L. 
REV. 687 (2006), and in particular this suggestion, as against an advocate of authorial 
intention: “Smith confuses, it seems to me, the question whether words convey a concept 
from one intelligent mind to another (communication) with the question whether words 
produce a concept in the person who reads or hears them (meaning). The bridegroom who 
says ‘I do,’ intending by that expression to mean ‘I do not,’ has not succeeded in 
communicating his intent; but what he has said unquestionably means that he consents to 
marriage.” Id. at 691. 
 25. In a detailed and instructive discussion, Lawrence Solum urges, “The core of the 
affirmative case for the Fixation Thesis is rooted in commonsense intuitions about the 
meaning of old texts of all kinds.” Lawrence B. Solum, The Fixation Thesis: The Role of 
Historical Fact in Original Meaning 28 (Feb. 3, 2015) (unpublished manuscript). One 
question is the weight to be given to those “common sense intuitions.” In my view, the 
answer is normative; it cannot emerge simply by recognizing what those intuitions are. 
 26. See JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM (2011). 
 27. See Lawrence B. Solum, Constitutional Texting, 44 San Diego L. Rev. 123 (2007), 
and in particular Solum’s suggestion: “Constitutional text messages will work best if they 
are constructed from widely shared public meanings.” Id. at 151 (emphasis added). 
 28. I am putting to one side the interpretation-construction discussion, discussed 
below. 
INTERPRETATION_FINAL DRAFT (DO NOT DELETE) 6/26/2015 2:45 PM 
2015] THERE IS NOTHING 199 
 
is what she has in mind.) We could also imagine a form of 
textualism that inquiries about contemporary meaning—thus 
calling for adherence to the current, rather than the historical, 
meaning of the constitutional text. To their credit, many of those 
who insist on fidelity to the original meaning do not insist that 
their own view is compelled by the very idea of interpretation. 
Instead they suggest that their own approach would lead to better 
consequences.29  
For example, Justice Scalia stresses the risks associated with 
judicial discretion, and he contends that if judges adhere to 
original meaning, those risks will be diminished, because judges 
will be constrained.30 Some originalists focus on the goal of 
democratic self-government, and they argue that if judges respect 
the original meaning, they will promote that goal. Consider the 
illuminating suggestion by Randy Barnett: “Given a sufficiently 
good constitutional text, originalists maintain that better results 
will be reached overall if government officials—including 
judges—must stick to the original meaning rather than 
empowering them to trump that meaning with one that they 
prefer.” 31 This is an explicit argument that the case for originalism 
depends on what will produce “better results” overall.32 
Of special importance here is Barnett’s emphasis on the need 
for a “sufficiently good constitutional text,” understood in light of 
the original meaning. Suppose that the constitutional text, taken 
only as such, is good, or good enough. But suppose that it is a great 
deal worse if it is understood in light of its original meaning. 
Imagine, for example, that it is hopelessly undemocratic, or that it 
entrenches racial injustice. If so, the argument for sticking with 
the original meaning would be weakened. In fact this is not an 
implausible account of the American Constitution. The text itself 
contains broadly appealing phrases, protecting “the freedom of 
speech” and guaranteeing “due process of law” and “the equal 
protection of the laws,” and vesting executive power in “a 
president of the United States.” There is a good argument that if 
these words were construed in accordance with their original 
 
 29. See Scalia, supra note 4; MCGINNIS & RAPPAPORT, supra note 9. 
 30. Scalia, supra note 4. 
 31. Randy Barnett & Cass Sunstein, Constitution in Exile? (May 2, 2005) (debate), 
available at http://legalaffairs.org/webexclusive/debateclub_cie0505.msp. 
 32. See also Lawson, supra note 14, at 1836 (“It is highly improbable that any 
plausible argument for the Constitution’s authority can be made that does not, at least to 
some extent, depend on the Constitution’s substance.”). 
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meaning, understood in terms of its expected applications,33 our 
constitutional order would be far worse than it is today.34 
True, we should agree that judges should be faithful to the 
text itself, even if the text were not as good as it is. If judges were 
not faithful to the text, it is fair to say that they would not be 
engaged in interpretation at all.35 If judges disregard authoritative 
texts, they cannot claim to be interpreting them. In that sense, the 
idea of interpretation does impose constraints on what judges may 
do. Moreover, legal systems do much better—and even count as 
legal systems36—if judges are faithful to authoritative texts. If they 
do not, the rule of law is itself in jeopardy,37 because judges would 
appear to be empowered to do whatever they want. In that sense, 
there is an excellent consequentialist argument in favor of taking 
constitutional texts as binding.38 But under the assumptions I have 
given, why should judges stick not merely with the text but also 
with its original meaning? If the consequences of sticking with it 
would be terrible, and if those consequences could be avoided 
with another approach, shouldn’t judges consider that other 
approach? 
These questions are not meant to be rhetorical; they suggest 
only that various approaches to interpretation are on the table. 
Many originalists find it both appropriate and necessary to argue 
that the consequences of their approach would not be terrible.39 
With Barnett, they urge that those consequences would be good.40 
 
 33. I am bracketing the question whether that is the right way to understand them. 
The only suggestion is that there is a strong argument against originalism if, understood in 
a certain way, it makes our constitutional system worse. It remains possible that some 
understandings of originalism would not have that effect. 
 34. See DAVID A. STRAUSS, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION (2010). 
 35. Lawrence B. Solum, The Interpretation-Construction Distinction, 27 CONST. 
COMMENT. 95 (2010). 
 36. Cf. LON FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW (1964). 
 37. For the best discussion, see Joseph Raz, The Rule of Law and its Virtue, in THE 
AUTHORITY OF LAW: ESSAYS ON LAW AND MORALITY 210 (1979). 
 38. This conclusion is not meant to address the question whether and when it is 
legitimate to construe the text in a way that does not quite fit its words, as in the claim that 
the first amendment (“Congress shall make no law abridging”) applies to all of the national 
government, and not merely Congress. Nor am I suggesting that consequentialism is the 
only way to choose among possible approaches to interpretation. See supra note 32. 
 39. We could imagine an argument that does not make a particular claim about what 
interpretation is, and that does not rest on consequences, but that invokes moral or 
political legitimacy. Such a claim might point in originalist or nonoriginalist directions. On 
the latter, see RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE (1986). I do not believe that arguments 
of this kind are promising, but I will simply bracket them here; they should be taken to be 
claims about what makes our constitutional order best, in the relevant sense. 
 40. See the subtle argument in Solum, supra note 9, which can be read to suggest a 
consequentialist argument in favor of originalism, stressing the virtues of stability and 
predictability. 
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They contend that their approach fits with a great deal of existing 
judicial doctrine, or at least with those aspects of it that seem least 
dispensable.41 Few contemporary originalists are willing to 
concede that under their approach, racial segregation is 
constitutionally acceptable—even though nothing in the original 
meaning bans segregation by the national government, and even 
though it is not at all easy to show that the Constitution bans 
segregation at the state level. Few contemporary originalists agree 
that their approach would allow the national government to 
prohibit women from working for the federal civil service, or 
would freely allow states to discriminate against women. 
On the contrary, originalists tend either to say little about the 
difficulty in squaring their approach with foundational 
commitments of the contemporary constitutional order, or to 
insist that the difficulty is not so severe, because originalism 
already embodies those commitments.42 Some originalists work 
extremely hard to try to demonstrate that point.43 They are right 
to do so, because the argument for their approach depends on that 
work. Whether or not that argument is convincing, what is 
noteworthy is that many of those who stress original meaning find 
it necessary to stress these points about consequences. They do 
not rest content with, or even make, the claim that their approach 
is built into the very idea of interpretation. 
Indeed, some originalists, notably Jack Balkin, insist that 
certain provisions of of the Constitution are written in general and 
abstract terms, which allows accommodation of evolving 
understandings.44 Some people who hold this view contend that 
the original understanding was that the Constitution creates 
broad principles whose concrete meaning would not be frozen in 
time.45 If their claim is about the intended meaning, or about the 
public meaning, it is not clear that they are right; the evidence is 
ambiguous here.46 But if they are, the line between originalism 
and other approaches starts to dissolve,47 because interpretation 
 
 41. See Michael W. McConnell, Originalism and the Desegregation Decisions, 81 VA. 
L. REV. 947 (1995); Steven G. Calabresi & Andrea Matthews, Originalism and Loving v. 
Virginia (Working Paper, 2012), available at http://scholarlycommons.law. northwestern.
edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1205&context=facultyworkingpapers. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. 
 44. See BALKIN, supra note 26. 
 45. See H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARV. 
L. REV. 885 (1985). 
 46. See id.; Solum, supra note 25; cf. Philip A. Hamburger, The Constitution’s 
Accommodation of Social Change, 88 MICH. L. REV. 239 (1989). 
 47. BALKIN, supra note 26. 
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of abstractions—what counts as “equal protection” or “the 
freedom of speech”—squarely invites the exercise of discretion on 
the part of the judges. And if Balkin’s view of interpretation is 
correct, my main conclusion holds: It is not because of anything 
intrinsic to the idea, but because its adoption would make our 
constitutional system better rather than worse. 
D. FIT AND JUSTIFICATION 
I have emphasized that the concept of interpretation does 
impose constraints. Some approaches cannot qualify as 
interpretation at all. Even if it would be good, pragmatically 
speaking, to substitute the best imaginable constitution for our 
own constitution, the substitution cannot count as interpretation. 
But the concept of interpretation does not compel any form of 
originalism. 
Let us now turn to nonoriginalist approaches. Suppose a 
judge thinks that where the Constitution is vague or open-
textured, he should interpret it to make the democratic process 
work as well as it possibly can—an idea that John Hart Ely48 and 
Justice Breyer49 have vigorously championed. Is that approach 
ruled off-limits by the very idea of interpretation? It is hard to see 
why. Justice Breyer has argued that a democracy-protective 
approach, honoring “active liberty,” fits with the text and 
purposes of the document even if it does not fit with the original 
meaning, narrowly conceived.50 (Recall that some originalists 
think that the Constitution was deliberately written in broad 
terms whose meaning was meant to evolve over time.) Breyer’s 
approach must be evaluated on its merits; it cannot be ruled off 
the table. To his credit, Breyer is candid about this point, and 
contends that the consequences of his preferred approach would 
be good.51 
The same is true for Dworkin’s preferred view, which is that 
the Constitution should be taken to include abstractions that 
invite moral reasoning from judges, and that judges must give 
those generalities the best moral readings that they can.52 Indeed, 
 
 48. ELY, supra note 5. 
 49. See BREYER, supra note 10. 
 50. See id. 
 51. See id.  
 52. See DWORKIN, supra note 6 or 39. 
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both the Lochner Court53 and the Warren Court54 approached the 
Constitution in this way, and many people, on both the right and 
the left, think the Court should resume something like this 
approach today.55 Whether or not it is the right approach, it would 
certainly count as interpretation within permissible linguistic 
understandings of the term. 
Dworkin has argued that legal interpretation involves two 
obligations.56 The first obligation is one of “fit”; an interpreter 
cannot simply ignore the materials that are being interpreted. The 
second is one of “justification.” What Dworkin means is that 
within the constraints of fit, an interpreter must justify the existing 
legal materials57 in the sense of making them the best that they can 
be. To explain this approach, Dworkin offers the arresting 
analogy of a chain novel.58 Suppose that you are the fifth writer in 
a chain, and that your task is to write the fifth chapter. Four 
writers have written four chapters before you. In writing the fifth 
chapter, you must write the novel that others have started, and 
not another. You cannot make up a whole new novel. Nor can you 
depart from what has come before, in the sense of producing a 
narrative that ignores it or makes it unintelligible or random. But 
you might well think that you have an obligation to make the 
novel good rather than terrible, and your authorship of the next 
chapter will be undertaken with that obligation in mind. 
Dworkin is right to observe that at least in a case system, 
judicial judgments often seem a lot like that. It is generally agreed 
that in the American constitutional system, judges who interpret 
the Constitution owe a duty of fidelity to what has come before 
(subject to the relevant theory of mistake).59 But they also have a 
degree of discretion. They can turn the tale in one direction or 
another. If, for example, the question is whether the Constitution 
requires states to recognize same-sex marriage, they must ask: 
 
 53. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
 54. See, e.g., Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Reynolds v. Simms, 377 U.S. 
533 (1964). 
 55. RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, THE CLASSICAL LIBERAL CONSTITUTION: THE 
UNCERTAIN QUEST FOR LIMITED GOVERNMENT (2014) seems to me in this vein. 
 56. DWORKIN, supra note 39. 
 57. I am bracketing for the moment the question whether those materials are limited 
to authoritative texts or whether they include (for example) previous judicial 
interpretations. 
 58. See DWORKIN, supra note 39. Of course there are diverse conceptions of what a 
novel is—of how it might be written and of how the various parts fit together. Dworkin is 
assuming a conventional conception, associated with nineteenth-century novels. 
 59. I mean to bracket the question of how much weight judges should accord to 
precedents. 
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What approach makes the best sense out of the existing materials? 
Of course it is true that an emphasis on fit and justification leaves 
many questions open. A recurring question is the relationship 
among the case law, social practices, and the original 
understanding of the text; what does the obligation of fit mean 
when these point in different directions?60 Different answers to 
that question are admissible within the general concept of 
interpretation. Democracy-reinforcement is one attempt to 
answer; so is originalism, focused as it is on the authoritative text 
and original understandings. 
On the basis of Dworkin’s argument, we might be tempted to 
think (as Dworkin does) that there is one thing that legal 
interpretation just is: an attempt to ensure both fit and 
justification. And it is true that originalists and moral readers, 
minimalists and democracy-reinforcers, those who insist on a 
presumption of constitutionality—all of these, and more, can 
accept the view that both fit and justification matter. But the 
temptation should be resisted. While Dworkin’s approach is one 
conception of interpretation, it is not the only one. If we believe 
that interpretation involves the search for authorial intentions, we 
will not much care about justification. We will attempt to identify 
a fact: What did the author(s) intend? It is true that the answer to 
that question might be difficult to find, and it is also true that there 
may be no answer to that question. But if so, we may have 
exhausted the act of interpretation. (Something similar can be 
said about those who emphasize the original public meaning.) At 
least that is one view (again, not the only one) of what 
interpretation is. 
E. INTERPRETATION AND CONSTRUCTION 
With a point of this kind in mind, some people have insisted 
on the importance of making a distinction between 
“interpretation” and “construction.”61 In an especially clear and 
illuminating discussion, Lawrence Solum suggests that 
interpretation attempts to discover the linguistic or semantic 
meaning of a legal text, whereas construction gives legal effect to 
that meaning.62 The First Amendment, for example, has a 
 
 60. See N.L.R.B. v. Canning, 573 U.S. _ (2014), where the justices divided on 
answering that question. 
 61. See KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION: DIVIDED 
POWERS AND CONSTITUTIONAL MEANING (1999). 
 62. See Solum, supra note 35. As Solum emphasizes, the distinction has a long history 
and has been understood in several different ways. 
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linguistic meaning (“no law abridging”), and no one can argue 
that the linguistic meaning is identical to various first amendment 
doctrines (the public forum doctrine, the lower level of protection 
accorded to commercial advertising, the exclusion of bribery, the 
distinction between content-based and content-neutral 
restrictions). Solum urges that interpretation “is guided by 
linguistic facts—facts about patterns of usage,”63 and is in that 
sense value-free or only “thinly normative,”64 in the sense that our 
normative views about what the law should be do not determine 
whether an interpretation is correct. 
By contrast, “theories of construction are ultimately 
normative,” in the sense that a judgment on behalf of one 
construction rather than another turns on “premises that go 
beyond linguistic facts.”65 In Solum’s terminology, an approach 
that favors deference to the political process is a theory of 
construction; it is unquestionably normative, but it does not allow 
judges to enlist their own moral or political beliefs in particular 
cases. When linguistic meaning of a text is vague (as it seems for 
many constitutional provisions), then the fact that judges are 
involved in construction, rather than interpretation, seems 
obvious. On Solum’s view, interpretation gives rise to a 
“construction zone.”66 For judges who find themselves in that 
zone, there are many ways to proceed; deference to the political 
process is merely one. 
If we accept this distinction, then we might say that there is 
nothing that construction just is, because construction cannot 
occur without some kind of normative argument, and because 
several (or many) normative arguments are consistent with the 
basic idea of construction. But on this view, there is something 
that interpretation just is, which is the elicitation of linguistic 
meaning. For this reason, some version of textualism —in Solum’s 
own account, one that is rooted in the original public meaning67—
is a necessary foundation for interpretation. The word “speech,” 
for example, cannot mean “Mars” or “President” or “horse” or 
“flood” or “ketchup,” and the words “due process” cannot mean 
“with pancakes” or “American slavery” or “long-burning 
candle.” In the eighteenth century, the word “goal” meant “jail,” 
 
 63. Id. at 104. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. 
 67. See Solum, supra note 14. 
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and if we read an eighteenth-century legal text using that word, 
we might well insist on the original public meaning to interpret it. 
As Solum acknowledges, however, there are different 
approaches to the identification of linguistic meaning. Original 
intention and original meaning are two, and it would also be 
possible (whether or not reasonable) to identify such meaning by 
pointing to contemporary understandings. In the case of an 
eighteenth-century text with the word “goal,” we would be drawn 
to some form of the originalism. (The same is true of the words 
“domestic violence” in the Constitution.68) Interpretation, 
understood as the search for linguistic meaning, can be treated as 
an important or even as the critical part of “fit”—and it is 
distinctive because it fastens on the obligation to attend to the 
semantic meaning of authoritative texts. 
If the distinction between interpretation and construction is 
understood in these terms, it is illuminating, not least because it 
helps to explain the potential legitimacy of a wide range of 
conceptions of what would (in this light) be characterized as 
construction. Moreover, it is true that any theory of interpretation 
has to be textualist—not in the sense that it must always “follow” 
the text, or may never depart from its ordinary meaning, but in 
the sense that it must always make the text the foundation for 
interpretation. And if interpretation is understood narrowly, to 
mean the elicitation of linguistic meaning, then everyone should 
agree that courts must engage in it, and that it rules many 
approaches out of bounds, not as illegitimate, but as not involving 
interpretation at all. For my purposes here, however, the central 
problems are that more than one approach can plausibly be 
treated as interpretive, and that in many cases, the idea of 
construction is doing crucial work. Indeed, we can understand 
those who deploy the interpretation/construction distinction as 
specifying a particular conception of interpretation—a 
conception that is reasonable and useful but by no means 
universally shared, and that diverges sharply from (for example) 
the conception used by Dworkin. In other words, Solum offers a 
narrow and linguistically plausible conception of what counts as 
interpretation, but in law, the idea of interpretation is often used 
to include what he characterizes as construction (as Solum 
acknowledges). 
In fact Solum goes further. He argues that “as a matter of 
fact, the meaning of a given constitutional provision is fixed at the 
 
 68. See id. 
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time of origin by its original public meaning,” and also that “as a 
matter of fact, the semantic content makes some contribution to 
American law.”69 In his view, “these factual claims are not based 
on arguments of political morality,” but instead rest on an 
understanding of how “communication through language 
works.”70 Solum seeks to “derive conclusions about constitutional 
meaning from nonnormative premises—that is, on the basis of 
premises that are not ethic or moral in nature.”71 Solum’s defense 
of this position is subtle and complex, but it is not clear that an 
understanding of “how communication through language works” 
can bear the relevant weight. Solum enlists an analogy: If we read 
a letter from centuries ago, and if it contains the word “deer,” we 
will interpret it by asking about the meaning of that word when 
the letter was written, not by consulting modern dictionaries. 
(Recall the eighteenth-century meaning of the word “goal.”) That 
is true, but is the constitutional setting analogous? Consider the 
view that judges should decide, as a matter of principle, whether 
current practices do deny people “equal protection of the laws,” 
or violate “the freedom of speech,” rather than asking about the 
original meaning of those words. Whether that view is right or 
wrong is a normative question. It cannot be settled by an 
understanding of how communication through language works. 
Philosophical work on that topic does not resolve the question of 
the appropriate judicial role undertaken under the capacious 
rubric of “interpretation.” 
III. DECISION COSTS AND ERROR COSTS 
Among the permissible alternatives, identification of the 
proper approach to constitutional interpretation requires 
attention to whether it would make our constitutional order 
better or worse. To be a bit more systematic: An approach to the 
Constitution might impose two kinds of costs. It might impose 
decision costs, by complicating people’s judgments, and it might 
impose error costs, by producing bad outcomes. 
Without making the ludicrous claim that these ideas should 
be understood in purely economic terms, we can insist that judges 
should consider the decisional burdens imposed by one or another 
approach to the founding document. Those burdens, or costs, 
might be faced by judges or by others, including legislators, 
 
 69. Solum, supra note 14, at 8. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. at 10. 
INTERPRETATION_FINAL DRAFT (DO NOT DELETE) 6/26/2015 2:45 PM 
208 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 30:193 
 
members of the executive branch, and citizens themselves, who 
must pay the cost of uncertainty. If courts declared that they 
would uphold any legislation unless the constitutional violation 
were clear,72 they would certainly lower decision costs, simply 
because almost all legislation would be immediately upheld. For 
judges, application of a deferential approach is generally 
straightforward. Originalists believe that their approach also 
lowers decision costs, and in particular that it promotes the rule 
of law, by increasing clarity and predictability.73 And to the extent 
that minimalism focuses judges narrowly on particular problems, 
it too imposes modest decisional burdens—at least in specific 
cases.74 
But it is also important to consider the number and the 
magnitude of errors. There would be serious reason to question 
any approach to the Constitution that would declare race and sex 
discrimination to be unobjectionable, or that would raise serious 
constitutional doubts about practices that the President and 
Congress have accepted for many decades. If an approach would 
greatly unsettle current institutional practices, there is reason to 
question it for that reason alone.75 If an approach would badly 
compromise democratic self-government, it would be 
objectionable for that reason, though the intensity of the 
objection depends on how we specify the nature and limits of that 
ideal.76 And if an approach would eliminate or undermine rights 
that Americans enjoy, and deserve to enjoy, then the approach is 
questionable on that very ground. 
True, reasonable people disagree about whether certain 
outcomes count as errors at all. Judges might agree that the choice 
among interpretive approaches depends on what approach makes 
our constitutional order best, but sharply disagree about how to 
answer that question. In my view, a disagreement of this kind 
helps to separate people who are committed to different 
 
 72. See WILKINSON, supra note 8. 
 73. See Scalia, supra note 4. For a contrary view, finding that as an empirical matter, 
political preferences play a major role in purportedly originalist decisions, see FRANK B. 
CROSS, THE FAILED PROMISE OF ORIGINALISM (2013). 
 74. One problem with minimalism is that it “exports” costs to subsequent 
decisionmakers. See Scalia, supra note 4. 
 75. Note that Justice Scalia describes himself as a “faint-hearted” originalist, because 
he is generally respectful of precedent. See Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of 
Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175 (1989). 
 76. For different views, see EPSTEIN, supra note 55; ELY, supra note 5; DWORKIN, 
supra note 6 or 39; BREYER, supra note 10. 
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approaches to constitutional interpretation.77 Nearly everyone 
would agree that if an approach is inconsistent with Brown v. Bd. 
of Educ., or with Loving v. Virginia, it runs into problems for that 
reason. And nearly everyone would agree that if an approach 
would license judges to invalidate legislation whenever they liked, 
it would be unacceptable for that reason as well. But if one or 
another approach would mean that the Constitution protects no 
right of privacy, does that count against that approach, or in its 
favor? If an approach would reduce constitutional protection of 
rights, is that a terrible problem, or might it be not so bad in light 
of the possibility (likelihood?) that democratic process would 
respect and protect such rights on their own? We can easily 
imagine disputes about such questions. Notably, they would have 
a significant empirical dimension. 
Often there is sufficient agreement to permit diverse people 
to engage with one another about appropriate approaches. But it 
must be emphasized that some arguments about the appropriate 
approach to interpretation are (implicitly) disputes about what 
kinds of results count as errors. 
IV. POSSIBLE WORLDS 
We can go further. No approach to constitutional law makes 
sense in every imaginable nation or in every possible world.78 The 
argument for any particular approach must depend, in large part, 
on a set of judgments about institutional capacities—above all, 
about the strengths and weaknesses of legislatures and courts. We 
cannot assess decision costs and errors costs without making those 
judgments. If judges are excellent and error-free, their excellence 
bears on the choice of a theory of interpretation. If judges are 
likely to blunder, their fallibility bears on the choice of a theory 
of interpretation. 
Consider this view, associated with James Bradley Thayer: 
Courts should uphold legislation unless it is plainly and 
 
 77. There are also, of course, disagreements about the role of intuitions or judgments 
about the nature of communication, see Solum, supra note 14, but for reason sketched 
above, I do not believe that any position on these issues can justify a unitary view about 
interpretation. See in particular the remarks above on the interpretation-construction 
distinction. 
 78. Cf. Waldron, supra note 8, at 1353 (“My argument against judicial review is not 
unconditional but depends on certain institutional and political features of modern liberal 
democracies.”). See also id. at 1361: “In general, I am assuming that the democratic 
institutions are in reasonably good order. They may not be perfect and there are probably 
ongoing debates as to how they might be improved. I assume these debates are informed 
by a culture of democracy, valuing responsible deliberation and political equality.” 
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unambiguously in violation of the Constitution.79 Few people now 
accept Thayer’s position, which has found no support on the 
contemporary Supreme Court. Because the Constitution is 
frequently ambiguous, Thayer’s approach would require courts to 
uphold almost all legislation—including school segregation in the 
District of Columbia, sex discrimination in federal employment, 
affirmative action, restrictions on abortion, mandatory school 
prayer, and much more. In these circumstances, it should be 
unsurprising that most judges assert their right to interpret the 
Constitution independently, refusing to accept the legislature’s 
view merely because the document is ambiguous. In the last half-
century, no member of the Court has been willing to endorse the 
proposition that legislation should be upheld unless the founding 
document is entirely clear. 
But imagine a society in which democratic processes work 
exceedingly fairly and well, so that judicial intervention is almost 
never required from the standpoint of anything that really 
matters.80 In such a society, racial segregation does not occur. 
Political processes are fair, and political speech is never banned. 
The legitimate claims of religious minorities and property holders 
are respected. The systems of federalism and separation of powers 
are safeguarded, and precisely to the right extent, by democratic 
institutions. 
Imagine too that in this society, judicial judgments are highly 
unreliable. From the standpoint of political morality, judges make 
systematic blunders when they attempt to give content to 
constitutional terms such as “equal protection of the laws” and 
“due process of law.” Resolving constitutional questions without 
respecting the views of the legislature, courts would make society 
worse, because their understandings of rights and institutions are 
so bad. In such a society, a Thayerian approach to the 
Constitution would make a great deal of sense, and judges should 
be persuaded to adopt it.81 These are extreme assumptions, of 
 
 79. See Thayer, supra note 3. See also Vermeule, supra note 8. 
 80. See Waldron, supra note 8, at 1360 (“We are to imagine a society with (1) 
democratic institutions in reasonably good working order, including a representative 
legislature elected on the basis of universal adult suffrage; (2) a set of judicial institutions, 
again in reasonably good order, set up on a nonrepresentative basis to hear individual 
lawsuits, settle disputes, and uphold the rule of law; (3) a commitment on the part of most 
members of the society and most of its officials to the idea of individual and minority rights; 
and (4) persisting, substantial, and good faith disagreement about rights (i.e., about what 
the commitment to rights actually amounts to and what its implications are) among the 
members of the society who are committed to the idea of rights.”). 
 81. I put to one side the evident fact that Thayerism cannot be a complete account of 
constitutional interpretation. We might agree that courts should strike down statutes only 
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course, but even if they are softened significantly, the argument 
for a Thayerian approach might be convincing, all things 
considered.82 
Many people reject the idea of minimalism.83 But imagine a 
society in which the original public meaning of the Constitution is 
not so excellent, in the sense that it does not adequately protect 
rights, properly understood, and in the sense that it calls for 
institutional arrangements (say, between Congress and the 
President) that become obsolete over time, as new circumstances 
and fresh needs arise. Imagine that in this society, the democratic 
process is good but not great, in the sense that it sometimes 
produces or permits significant injustices. Suppose finally that in 
this society, judges will do poorly if they strike out on their own, 
or if they attempt to build doctrine on the basis of high-level 
theory, but very well if they build modestly and incrementally on 
their own precedents, following something like the common-law 
method.84 In such a society, a minimalist approach to the 
Constitution would have a great deal to commend it. 
Or consider a society in which democratic processes work 
poorly, in the sense that they do not live up to democratic ideals, 
and also in which political majorities invade fundamental rights—
say, freedom of religion and freedom of speech. Suppose that in 
this society, judges are trustworthy, in the sense that they can 
make democratic processes work better (say, by safeguarding the 
right to vote), and also that they can protect fundamental rights, 
as they really should be understood. In such a society, the 
argument for democracy-reinforcement, and for moral readings, 
would be quite strong. 
We should now be able to see that none of these approaches 
is ruled out by the Constitution itself. Each can be implemented 
in a way that firmly respects the document’s text and attempts to 
interpret it. The question is how to do so. If the founding 
 
when the violation of the Constitution is clear; but how do we know when the violation is 
clear? To work, Thayerism needs to be supplemented by some kind of account of 
constitutional meaning. On an extreme view, Thayerism would mean that courts should 
uphold legislation unless it is patently inconsistent with the Constitution on any account of 
how to ascertain its meaning. 
 82. See VERMEULE, supra note 8. 
 83. See Scalia, supra note 75. Note that minimalism is also an incomplete account of 
constitutional interpretation. We might agree that courts should favor small steps and 
incompletely theorized rulings; but within those constraints, in what directions shall they 
go? By itself, minimalism does not tell us. We could imagine Thayerian minimalists, 
originalist minimalists, democracy-reinforcing minimalists, and many others. 
 84. See STRAUSS, supra note 34. 
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document set out the rules for its own interpretation, judges 
would be bound by those rules (though any such rules would 
themselves need to be construed). But the Constitution sets out 
no such rules. For this reason, any approach to the document must 
be defended by reference to some account that is supplied by the 
interpreter. 
The meaning of the Constitution must be made rather than 
found, not in the grand (and preposterous) sense that it is entirely 
up for grabs, but in the more mundane sense that it must be settled 
by an account of interpretation that it does not itself contain. The 
idea of interpretation is a capacious one, and a range of 
approaches fit within it. Among the reasonable alternatives, any 
particular approach to the Constitution must be defended on the 
ground that it makes the relevant constitutional order better 
rather than worse. 
 
